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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In an age when news of a corporate merger seldom raises an 
eyebrow, it should come as no surprise that regulatory organizations 
would eventually follow suit.  Corporate mergers are typically the result 
of efforts to increase the financial worth of the resultant company, in 
hopes of higher stock prices and, therefore, wealthier shareholders.  
However, the recent consolidation between the regulatory arm1 of the 
New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) and the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (“NASD”), the two self-regulatory organizations 
(“SROs”) chiefly responsible for oversight of the U.S. securities 
industry, is the by-product of a different type of sought reward: 
efficiency.2
For years, members of the industry criticized the duplicative efforts 
made by these two agencies and the discrepancies resulting from 
conflicting rules.3  Under the former system, firms belonging to both 
agencies were “subject to dual—but not always consistent—rulebooks, 
examinations, investigations, sweeps and enforcement actions.”4  In an 
attempt to rid the regulatory oversight schema of such contradictory 
rules, these two organizations “unveiled . . . a plan to merge some of 
 1. NYSE, Complaints & Inquiries, http://www.nyse.com/regulation/complaintsinq 
uiries/1088808969148.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2008).  Only certain areas of NYSE 
Regulation were affected by the consolidation.  “Specifically, NYSE Regulation 
continues to be responsible for conducting market surveillance and enforcing rules and 
laws that relate to trading activity occurring on NYSE and NYSE Arca, as well as 
ensuring that companies listed on NYSE and NYSE Arca meet their financial and 
corporate governance listing standards.” Id. 
 2. Consolidation of NASD and Regulatory Functions of the NYSE: Working 
Towards Improved Regulation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs (May 17, 2007) (testimony of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman and CEO of 
FINRA), available at http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/MaryL.Sch 
apiro/P019169 [hereinafter Schapiro Testimony]. 
 3. William H. Donaldson & Harvey L. Pitt, Outdated and Inefficient, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 6, 2007, at A7. 
 4. Id. 
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their operations” in November 2006.5  The final organization became 
known as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”).6
As with any business deal affecting the overall economy, questions 
were raised concerning the potential impact on the public.7  The 
overarching purpose of the merger was investor protection.8  However, 
with optimism waning in the wake of the subprime mortgage debacle 
and the American economy dangling over the precipice of recession, 
some consumer advocates have questioned whether now is the best time 
to reduce the number of regulators looking out for their interests.9  To 
the contrary, such issues prove that now is precisely the time to 
consolidate and streamline the regulatory system. 
The consolidation not only serves to address the issues of 
duplication and inefficiency within the regulatory structure, but also the 
conflicts of interest that in recent years have resulted as both 
organizations focused on profit generation instead of on their obligations 
as supervisory organizations.10  The NASD’s role as creator and former 
owner of the NASDAQ and the NYSE’s transition to a for-profit entity 
in 2006 caused some to question whether the two self-regulatory 
organizations could continue to regulate member firms in an impartial 
manner.11  Their return to exclusive service as regulatory agencies, 
especially in this time of economic turmoil, reinforces the true 
regulatory mission of investor protection. 
A.  Sub-Prime Disaster 
Recent headlines have drawn the world’s attention to the subprime 
crisis that has infiltrated virtually every aspect of the financial sector.  
 5. Randall Smith & Kara Scannell, NASD, NYSE Agree to Merge Some 
Oversight–Supporters Foresee Streamlining In Market Regulation as Foes Fear Less 
Protection For Individuals, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2006, at C1. 
 6. FINRA, About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, 
http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/CorporateInformation/index.htm (last visited Apr. 
30, 2008) [hereinafter About FINRA]. 
 7. Carol E. Curtis, Bumps Emerge on Road to Completion of SRO Merger, SEC. 
INDUS. NEWS, June 11, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 10863673 (Westlaw). 
 8. See Helen Kearney, Regulation: The Burden and the Backlash, ON WALL 
STREET, Feb. 1, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 1930499 (Westlaw). 
 9. Id. 
 10. George R. Kramer & Alan E. Sorcher, The Conflicting Roles of the New York 
Stock Exchange, J. OF INV. COMPLIANCE, Dec. 22, 2006, at 54. 
 11. Id. 
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Although some sectors have been impacted more than others, the 
securities industry has surely been shaken.12  Over the past few years, 
credit terms had become uncharacteristically flexible and home loans 
easily available, allowing anyone, including those with poor credit 
histories and with low incomes, to qualify for a home mortgage loan.13  
The easy access to credit appealed to individuals seeking the American 
dream of home ownership.  Sadly, the dream turned into a nightmare as 
many, especially those with adjustable rate mortgages, found themselves 
unable to afford their mortgage payments and, subsequently, in default 
on their loans.14  Since the interest rates on over 1.8 million subprime 
mortgages are scheduled to increase in 200815 and 2009, the number of 
foreclosures will almost certainly continue to rise, necessitating the 
financial industry to address the consequences of its investment 
participation in subprime mortgages. 
The stock market fallout in 200016 led to the development of 
innovative yet highly speculative financial products, such as credit 
default swaps, collateralized debt obligations, and other financial 
vehicles backed by subprime mortgages.17  These investment choices 
precipitated the venomous effects of the subprime mess on the brokerage 
industry.18  A true domino effect, one by one the big Wall Street firms 
stepped forward with their massive subprime-related losses.19  After 
releasing its 2007 third-quarter earnings, Citigroup announced that it 
would write down over $5 billion in losses, deeply cutting into the 
 12. Mark Gongloff, Credit Woes Slam Stocks, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 2007, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119608282533903873.html. 
 13. Edmund L. Andrews, Fed Shrugged as Subprime Crisis Spread, INT’L HERALD 
TRIBUNE, Dec. 18, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/12/18/business/ 
18subprime.php. 
 14. Noelle Knox, Record Foreclosures Hit Mortgage Lenders, USA TODAY, Mar. 
13, 2007, available at http://wwww.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2007-03-
13-foreclosures_N.htm. 
 15. Number of Foreclosures Soared in 2007, MSNBC.com, Jan. 29, 2008, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22893703. 
 16. Noelle Knox, Mortgage Crisis: Home Loans Are Harder to Get, USA TODAY, 
Aug. 6, 2007, available at  http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2007-
08-05-mortgage-lenders_N.htm. 
 17. Time to Brace for Impact, INV. ADVISER, Dec. 17, 2007, available at 2007 
WLNR 25785654 (Westlaw).
 18. Shawn Tully, Wall Street’s Money Machine Breaks Down, FORTUNE, Nov. 12, 
2007, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2007/11/2 
6/101232838/index.htm. 
 19. Id. 
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company’s financials.20  The amount of write-downs continued to rise, 
resulting in thousands of employee layoffs.21  Merrill was also dealt a 
hard blow and is expected to write-down over $15 billion.22  Others 
soon followed,23 and the full extent of the damage is still to be 
determined. 
The meltdown left many questioning why regulators did not 
prevent, or even foresee, the crisis, and wondering who dropped the 
ball.24  Many blamed the regulators for failing to recognize the 
foreseeable credit issues that would arise from this type of 
securitization.25  Some asked, “[Where was the NASD] when subprime 
funds were being dreamed up and then packaged and sold?”26  While it 
is too late to undo the damage, the consolidation comes at a crucial point 
in our economy’s history and can be a tool to analyze what went wrong 
and prevent a future disaster. 
B.  The Solution 
The consolidation between the NYSE and NASD happened at the 
right time.  Not even a year into its existence, FINRA already initiated a 
sweep to investigate firms and their marketing to customers of financial 
products tied to mortgages.27  Because of its new structure, FINRA is 
 20. Charles Gasparino, Citigroup Plans New Round of ‘Massive’ Job Cuts, 
CNBC.com, Nov. 26, 2007, http://www.cnbc.com/id/21974307/. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Julia Werdigier & Jenny Anderson, Giant Write-Down is Seen for Merrill, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/11/business/11wall 
.html. 
 23. David Reilly & Karen Richardson, For Financial Stocks, Is It Another False 
Bottom?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2008, at C1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/S 
B120044238607892763.html. 
 24. Paul Krugman, Blindly into the Bubble, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2007, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/21/opinion/21krugman.html. 
 25. See, e.g., Jessica Dickler, Senator Faults Regulators in Subprime Mess, 
CNNMoney.com, Mar. 27, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/03/26/real_estate/Dodd/in 
dex.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2008); Dan Taylor, As NASD/FINRA Fiddled, Credit 
Markets Burned, INVESTMENTNEWS, Aug. 13, 2007, available at 
http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070813/FREE/7081302
1/1006. 
 26. Taylor, supra note 25. 
 27. David Scheer & Jesse Westbrook, Broker Probed by FINRA on Mortgage 
Security Sales, Person Says, Bloomberg.com, Jan. 4, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=apNYRLoCVcUk&refer=home. 
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able to place more emphasis on this crisis and on investor protection.28  
With a two entity system, “multiple levels of regulation [made it] 
difficult to navigate and expose[d] consumers to gaps in protections.”29  
A single non-profit regulatory structure allows for more centralized 
oversight of these areas and is better able to safeguard investors.30  The 
NYSE and NASD previously acted as both market operators and 
regulators, which gave rise to potential conflicts and concerns.31  The 
new regulatory organization is again directing its attention on 
investors.32  FINRA is closely scrutinizing any areas where greater 
protection is required and taking further action regarding solicitation and 
product suitability for seniors.33  It also uses a risk-based approach to 
identify and combat critical financial industry issues.34  This is 
particularly necessary for the organizations entrusted with supervision 
over those engaged in the financial industry, since the markets are open 
to all participants, from the novice and inexperienced to the most 
sophisticated investor. 
FINRA named investor protection as its primary goal and has 
already developed several programs to further its commitment to this 
objective.35  Although investor protection was previously an objective of 
both SROs, their preoccupation with other market activities, such as 
merging with exchanges, steered their attention away from this 
purpose.36  With U.S. capital markets serving as one of the leading and 
most powerful forces in the world, it is essential that investors have trust 
 28. See FINRA, Putting Investors First, http://www.finra.org/InvestorInformation/ 
InvestorProtection/PuttingInvestorsFirst/index.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2008). 
 29. Kearney, supra note 8. 
 30. Doug Schulman, Vice Chairman, NASD, Remarks at the Securities Traders 
Association (Jan. 26, 2007), http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/Doug 
lasShulman/P018435 (last visited Apr. 30, 2008). 
 31. Consolidation of NASD and Regulatory Functions of the NYSE: Working 
Towards Improved Regulation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs (May 17, 2007) (statement of Marc E. Lackritz, President, Securities 
Industry Association), available at  http://www.sifma.org/legislative/testimony/pdf/lack 
ritz5-17-07.pdf [hereinafter Lackritz Testimony]. 
 32. Mary L. Schapiro, CEO, FINRA, Remarks at SIFMA Annual Meeting (Nov. 9, 
2007), http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/MaryL.Schapiro/P037447 
(last visited Apr. 30, 2008) [hereinafter Schapiro, Remarks at SIFMA]. 
 33. Kearney, supra note 8. 
 34. Schapiro, Remarks at SIFMA, supra note 32. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See generally NYSE Euronext, Timeline, http://www.nyse.com/about/history/ 
timeline_2000_Today_index.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2008). 
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and confidence in the system.37  This requires constant transformation 
and adoption of innovative measures to keep up with the ever-changing 
environment. 
C.  The Merger 
Aside from gaining recognition as the first exceptional change to 
the securities oversight structure in decades, this merger also drew great 
attention because of the parties involved.  Regulatory organizations such 
as the former NASD are generally non-profit organizations and their 
main function is to effectively regulate their respective fields, not to 
generate income.38  Therefore, merging of such organizations involved 
different motivation than typical mergers between for-profit companies.  
Whenever for-profit organizations seek to merge, management has a 
tendency to “envision new markets, more product lines and healthier 
balance sheets.”39  The transaction’s main objective typically is to 
increase the bottom line.40  Profit is so important that parties in these 
impending mergers might be subjected to undesirable tactics since 
different people and entities might not share the same perspectives on 
profit.41
Non-profits generally have less financial-related motivations to 
consolidate.42  The most frequently cited benefits for merging non-profit 
organizations include “increased effect and reach,” fewer redundancies 
in a specific area, “greater efficienc[y],” “stronger organization,” and 
 37. See Mary L. Schapiro, CEO, FINRA, Remarks at the Exchequer Club (June 20, 
2007), http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/MaryL.Schapiro/P019306 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2008). 
 38. Schulman, supra note 30. 
 39. Not-For-Profit Advisor, On the Verge of a Merge? What to Consider Before 
Proceeding, http://www.plantemoran.com/Industries/PublicSector/NotForProfit/Resour 
ces/Not+For+Profit+Advisor/2006+Winter/On+the+Verge+of+a+Merge+What+to+Co
nsider+Before+Proceeding.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2008) [hereinafter Not-For-Profit 
Advisor]. 
 40. Cf. Judith R. Thoyer, A New Look At Post-Merger Governance: The Dow Jones 
Acquisition, PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, PLI Order No. 13964 657, 661 (2008) 
(discussing social issues involves in various transactions). 
 41. See Robert Guy Matthews, Rio Tinto’s Earnings Illustrate Why It’s in Play, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2008, at A13.  BHP Billiton submitted an unsolicited takeover 
offer for its rival RIO Tinto and RIO has been calling for rejection of the bid because, 
among other things, it undervalues the company. 
 42. Not-For-Profit Advisor, supra note 39. 
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“the continued ability to fulfill one’s mission.”43  While FINRA’s goal 
could be said to achieve all of these benefits, its foremost objectives are 
to protect investors and advance market integrity by increasing 
efficiency.44  Two separate regulators essentially performing the same 
functions was inefficient.  Other countries recognized the presence of 
multiple regulators as a shortcoming within their regulatory systems and 
are now consolidating, if they have not already successfully done so.45
On May 20, 1997, the U.K.’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, the 
principal Finance Minister of the British government, announced that it 
would merge “banking supervision and investment services 
regulation”46 into what was then known as the Securities and Investment 
Board (“SIB”).  SIB officially changed its name to the Financial 
Services Authority (“FSA”) in October 199747 and continues to serve as 
a model of streamlined regulation.48  This single organization is 
responsible for overseeing the banking, brokerage, and insurance 
industries49 and employs principles-based regulation, which allows firms 
to decide how best to achieve their desired outcomes, rather than a rules-
based regulation system like in the United States,50 which instead 
focuses on the means.51  Other countries followed the trend in regulatory 
consolidation, especially members of the European Union (“E.U.”).52
The European Central Bank has cited two main motivations for 
consolidating supervisory functions within the E.U.53  “First, they 
represent a response to the rapid developments in the financial sector, 
 43. Id. 
 44. FINRA, Putting Investors First, supra note 28. 
 45. Federal Financial Services Regulatory Consolidation, Overview, 
http://www.opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL33036/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2008). 
 46. History of the FSA, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/Who/History/index.sht 
ml (last visited May 1, 2008). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Kearney, supra note 8. 
 49. FSA, FSA Sector Teams, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/Teams/index.sht 
ml (last visited Apr. 30, 2008). 
 50. Roel C. Campos, Comm’r, SEC, Speech at the Luxembourg Fund Industry 
Association: Principles v. Rules (June 14, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007 
/spch061407rcc.htm. 
 51. John Tiner, CEO, FSA, Speech at APCIMS Annual Conference (Oct. 13, 
2006), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2006/1013_jt.sh 
tml (last visited May 7, 2008). 
 52. European Central Bank, Developments in National Supervisory Structures, 
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/supervisorystructureen.pdf  (last visited Mar. 8, 2008). 
 53. Id. 
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also with a view to national peculiarities.  Second, they aim at enhancing 
the effectiveness and efficiency of supervision.”54  Essentially, these 
countries have adopted the view that less is more when it comes to 
financial oversight.55  While other countries and territories outside the 
E.U., like Hong Kong,56 Dubai,57 and Japan,58 have also made attempts 
to consolidate their financial regulators,59 the FSA’s structure is 
frequently mentioned as the prototype to be emulated by regulatory 
bodies considering a merger.60  The FSA’s timely address of the 
subprime issues and shoddy lending practices within the U.K. in July 
2007 further demonstrated its effectiveness in regulating the financial 
industry.61  The U.K. was not impacted as severely as the U.S., with 
subprime lending accounting for only 10% of all homes in the country.62  
For such reasons, the NYSE and NASD worked cooperatively with the 
FSA during the consolidation process and FINRA continues to do so, 
especially to obtain guidance in its implementation of principles-based 
regulation.63
 54. Id. 
 55. See generally id. (discussing the developments in national supervisory 
structures of E.U. countries). 
 56. See The Securities and Futures Commission Homepage, http://www.sfc.hk/sfc/ 
html/EN/ (last visited May 1, 2008). 
 57. Dubai Financial Services Authority, http://www.dfsa.ae/dfsa/about+us/who_we 
_are/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2008). 
 58. See Financial Services Agency Organization, http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/about/ab 
out01_menu.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2008) (showing the consolidated structure of the 
Japanese Financial Services Agency). 
 59. Steve Zwick, Rube Goldberg’s Regulatory Legacy, FUTURES CHI., Feb. 1, 
2008, available at 2008 WLNR 2248865 (Westlaw). 
 60. Jeremy Grant, US Looks to London for Regulatory Model, FIN. TIMES ASIA, 
Dec. 14, 2007, at 6, available at 2007 WLNR 24641743 (Westlaw). 
 61. Jennifer Hughes & Jane Croft, FSA in Subprime Crackdown, FIN. TIMES 
LONDON, July 5, 2007, at 17. 
 62. Patrick Collinson, Subprime Lender Becomes First British Victim of Credit 
Crunch, GUARDIAN, Sept. 11, 2007, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/20 
07/sep/11/money.mortgages. 
 63. Schapiro, Remarks at SIFMA, supra note 32. 
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II.  PRE-CONSOLIDATION 
The NYSE and the NASD have long been recognized as two of the 
leading SROs in the United States.64  Both were instrumental in ensuring 
that the firms they regulate65 comply with the multitude of securities 
industry rules and regulations.66  While the two served similar purposes 
as regulators, each had a very distinct history and origin as an SRO.  In 
order to truly appreciate the magnitude of the recent consolidation, it is 
essential to understand their background and establishment as regulatory 
agencies. 
A.  The New York Stock Exchange 
Before passage of the federal securities laws67 and the founding of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), the NYSE had long 
served as one of the principal exchanges for trading in securities.68  The 
NYSE originated in 1792.69  For over a century, the NYSE, as well as 
the other existing exchanges at the time, remained an unregulated entity, 
governed only by its floor members and plagued with market 
manipulation.70  Some cite the lack of regulation of the securities 
industry as one of the reasons why the economic crisis, spurred 
primarily by fraudulent activity,71 culminated and crippled the American 
 64. Both were established as SROs after the Maloney Act was passed in 1968. 15 
U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1968). 
 65. About FINRA, supra note 6.  There are over 5,000 brokerage firms being 
regulated by these entities. Id. 
 66. In addition to complying with the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, members of the securities industry must also comply with rules 
created by the SROs. See generally Self-Regulatory Organizations: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (Mar. 9, 2006) (statement of Robert 
Glauber, Chairman, NASD), http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/Rob 
ertR.Glauber/P016123 (Mar. 9, 2006) [hereinafter Glauber Testimony]. 
 67. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
15 U.S.C. § 78a.  Both were enacted during a time of economic turmoil following the 
Stock Market Crash of 1929. 
 68. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 73 (3d ed. 
2003). 
 69. See History of the NYSE, http://www.nyse.com/about/history/1089312755484 
.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2008). 
 70. SELIGMAN, supra note 68, at 48. 
 71. See id. 
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economy with the stock market crash in 1929.72  This disaster caused a 
national crisis as millions of people lost their life savings.73  This called 
for reform and close scrutiny of financial practices, since investors lost 
confidence in the American economy.74  In order to prevent another 
such catastrophe and to restore trust in the markets, Congress began 
probing into the potential causes of the crash.75
From 1932 to 1934, the Senate Banking and Currency Committee 
conducted an “investigation of stock exchange practices, usually called 
the Pecora Hearings, in recognition of the decisive role played by the 
committee’s counsel, Ferdinand Pecora.”76  The investigation revealed 
an abundance of corruption and supervisory deficiencies.77  One area of 
focus concerned the NYSE’s listing procedures, specifically its approval 
process and due diligence when registering a company’s stock.78  
Enforcement of its listing requirements became unmanageable and 
virtually nonexistent with the increase in new stock applications 
between 1926 and 1929,79 leading to the listing of worthless securities.80  
Frank Altschul, chairman of the NYSE’s Committee on Stock List, 
stated at the Pecora Hearings “that the NYSE ceased making any 
independent investigation of an application for the listing of additional 
stock by a firm whose stock was previously listed unless there appeared 
 72. In addition to lax or nonexistent regulation of the stock market, there was a 
proliferation of mischief and unscrupulous activity in other areas of the financial sector. 
Id.  Accounting principles were lenient during this time since firms were free to employ 
whatever accounting methods they wanted, resulting in companies overstating their 
worth in their financial statements and misrepresenting themselves to the investing 
public. Id. 
 73. DAVID M. KENNEDY, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN THE GREAT DEPRESSION: 
FREEDOM FROM FEAR, PART ONE 163 (9th ed. 1999). 
 74. ROBERT S. MCELVAINE, THE GREAT DEPRESSION: AMERICA 1929-1941, at 48 
(Three Rivers Press N.Y. 1993). 
 75. SELIGMAN, supra note 68, at 2. 
 76. Id. at 1. 
 77. Cf. id. at 2 (discussing the fact that the conclusions of the Pecora hearings were 
intended “to diminish . . . faith in the nation’s financial institutions”). 
 78. See id. at 47. 
 79. Id. at 47 (stating that new stock applications rose from 300 to over 750 between 
1926 and 1929). 
 80. Id.  In 1929, the NYSE had allowed Krueger and Toll Company to list “a 
thirty-year debenture, reserving the right to substitute new pledged securities for those 
listed as collateral on the application.” Id.  The company later “replaced the French 
debentures serving as collateral with less valuable Yugoslavian debentures.” Id. 
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patently suspicious matter in the listing application.”81  Pecora 
successfully identified an instance where the NYSE failed to investigate 
even when there was such a suspect matter.82
Specialist trading was also closely scrutinized.  Specialists are 
responsible for maintaining a fair and orderly market in a specific 
security by “acting as brokers’ brokers who [execute] purchase or sell 
orders when the market price reache[s] [a] stipulated price . . . .”83  
Allegations “were made repeatedly” throughout the hearings accusing 
specialists of using “their pivotal position to orchestrate pool operations 
or exploit[ing] their knowledge of the specialist books in trading for 
their own accounts.”84  The NYSE’s lack of oversight in these areas was 
later used as leverage to gain approval for restructuring of the 
organization’s board.85  Conclusion of the hearings led to the creation of 
the SEC in 1934 and manifold industry regulations in an attempt to 
restore investor confidence in the U.S. markets.86  Even with the newly 
created SEC, the market came close to suffering another crash between 
1937 and 1938.87  Many condemned the government’s efforts and cited 
them as the cause of the recession that ensued shortly after the passage 
of the federal securities laws.88
SEC Chairman, William O. Douglas, in advocating the Act, 
attributed the economic downturn to the NYSE’s regulatory 
deficiencies89 and prevailing conflicts of interest.90  Douglas feared 
repercussions stemming from the brokerage firms’ outcries, such as 
hindrance from future securities legislation and repeal of some of the 
SEC’s powers.91  Douglas called for complete revamping of the NYSE’s 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 335. 
 84. Id. at 74.  Evidence was discovered between May 3 and July 24, 1933, 
uncovering a scheme involving Russell Brown, a specialist on the NYSE, who also 
happened to be chairman of the board of American Commercial Alcohol.  He and 
several other individuals organized a pool operation, driving up American 
Commercial’s stock price from $20 to almost $90. Id. at 88. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. at 99. 
 87. See id. at 160-61. 
 88. See generally id. 
 89. Id. at 162.  Prior to becoming the SEC Chairman, William O. Douglas had been 
a Yale Law Professor who opposed the Securities Act. Id. at 71. 
 90. Id. at 162-63. 
 91. Id. at 162. 
2008 “FIN RAH!” . . . A WELCOME CHANGE 841 
 
board to include a salaried, independent (non-industry) chair92 and to 
focus on representing the interests of the public.  The existing structure 
consisted of “floor traders and specialists who dominated New York 
Stock Exchange governance.”93  Douglas believed that independence of 
board management would help eliminate the conflicts that had 
proliferated throughout the industry,94 mainly involving member 
trading.95  Douglas suspected that members’ short sale trading had 
precipitated the extreme decline in the markets in 1937.96  On March 17, 
1938, on the heels of former NYSE President Richard Whitney’s 
expulsion from the industry for embezzlement,97 revisions to the 
Exchange’s constitution were adopted.98  Douglas resigned from the 
SEC in 1939 after President Franklin D. Roosevelt selected him to serve 
as a Supreme Court Justice.99
In 1970, Congress enacted the Securities Investors Protection Act 
(“SIPA”), “creating the Securities Investor Protection Corporation 
(“SIPC”) to administer a fund providing $50,000 of insurance protection 
to each customer of virtually all broker-dealers registered with the 
SEC.”100  SIPA vested the SEC with the authority to: (1) compel SROs 
to implement any particular alterations or modifications to its rules, 
practices or procedures related to the regularity and scope of its 
investigations and examinations of its member firms; (2) require that 
SROs supply the SIPC and/or the SEC with any reports or records 
concerning the financial state of specific SRO members; and (3) require 
that an SRO inspect a member company’s financial state.101  The 
NYSE’s Board of Governors asked the then former NYSE chairman, 
William McChesney Martin, Jr., “to prepare a comprehensive study of 
 92. Id. at 161. 
 93. Id. at 86. 
 94. See id. at 163. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 162 (focusing specifically on the declines between September 7 and 
October 25, 1937). 
 97. Id. at 173.  Richard Whitney was NYSE President from 1930-1935. Id. 
 98. Id.  William McChesney Martin, Jr. was appointed President of the NYSE, 
serving in that role until 1940. Id. at 235. 
 99. ROBERT SOBEL, A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 1935-1975, at 
62-63 (1975). 
 100. SELIGMAN, supra note 68, at 465. 
 101. Id. 
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the New York Stock Exchange’s constitution, rules, and procedures,”102 
which later became known as the Martin Report.103
The Martin Report recommended reorganization of the NYSE to 
recognize “its public nature and the respective interests of the public, the 
companies listed on the exchange, and the members of the securities 
industry involved.”104  As a result, the NYSE restructured its board such 
that it was “balanced between securities firms and issuer, institutional 
investor, and public representatives.”105  Additionally, it created a 
nominating committee completely independent of both NYSE members 
and the NYSE board and gave the committee the responsibility of 
selecting new candidates for the board.106  The NYSE also “became a 
non-profit, non-dividend paying corporation, owned by its members.”107
In December 2003, the SEC approved the NYSE’s proposed rule 
change to amend its constitution and again reorganize its governance.108  
The most significant change was a decrease in the number of board 
representatives and complete independence from management of the 
NYSE.109  Up to this point, the NYSE’s board had been comprised of up 
to 24 members.110  The approved governance structure in 2003 reduced 
it to “between 6 and 12 members.”111
The next few years marked some extraordinary changes in NYSE 
history.112  The merger of the NYSE and Archipelago Holdings Inc., 
operator of an electronic communications network, officially ended the 
 102. Id. at 469. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See Concerning Improving the Governance of the New York Stock Exchange: 
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (Nov. 20, 2003) 
(statement of William H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/testimony/ts112003whd.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2008). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Amendment and 
Restatement of the Constitution of the Exchange to Reform the Governance and 
Management Architecture of the Exchange, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48946, File 
No. SR-NYSE-2003-34 (Dec. 17, 2003), available at http://sec.gov/rules/sro/34-
48946.htm. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See generally SELIGMAN, supra note 68 (discussing the transformation of Wall 
Street and the financial industry). 
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NYSE sale of seats on December 30, 2005.113  This was a significant 
change to the NYSE’s membership structure.  The result was the “NYSE 
Group, Inc., a for-profit, publicly-owned company.”114  Rather than 
taking the initial public offering route and offering new shares, the 
NYSE became a public company by virtue of its merger with 
Archipelago.115  The public could now own a piece of one of the major 
U.S. securities exchanges.  In 2007, the NYSE merged with Euronext, 
the pan-European exchange running “stock exchanges in Paris, 
Amsterdam, Brussels and Portugal, as well as a derivatives exchange in 
London.”116  This merger resulted in the “first trans-Atlantic stock 
exchange[,]”117 “offer[ing a] diverse array of financial products and 
services.”118  Already known as “the world’s largest and most liquid 
cash equities exchange,”119 the NYSE now gained an even greater 
presence in the markets.  It was at this juncture that the organization was 
ready to engage in the most noteworthy merger in securities industry 
history—consolidation with the NASD. 
1.  The National Association of Securities Dealers 
In 1938, Congress passed the Maloney Act,120 amending the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.121  The Maloney Act “established 
the concept of a registered national securities association or SRO,”122 
 
 113. NYSE Euronext Timeline, supra note 36. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Jerry Knight, Stock Markets on the Open Market: Exchanges Go Public, 
Generate Windfalls, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2006, at D1. 
 116. Mark Stein, From Top of the Corporate World to Appeals Court, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 27, 2006, at C2. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Press Release, NYSE, Shares of NYSE Euronext Begin Trading, Marking the 
Beginning of the First Truly Global Financial Marketplace (Apr. 4, 2007), 
http://www.nyse.com/press/1175665133200.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2008).  “NYSE 
Euronext [brings] together six cash equities exchanges in five countries and six 
derivatives exchanges [and now serves as] a world leader for listings, trading in cash 
equities, equity and interest rate derivatives, bonds and the distribution of market data.” 
Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See Maloney Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1938). 
 121. Joshua E. Levine, The New Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, N.Y.L.J., 
Aug. 16, 2007, at 4. 
 122. Id. 
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which would “regulate the activities of their member broker-dealers.”123  
The SEC would keep watch over SROs, which included the NYSE, and 
the SROs would now be required “to implement the federal securities 
laws as well as their own rules.”124
In addition to heightening SRO standards, the NASD was 
established 125 to police over-the-counter (“OTC”) trading.  Knowing 
that it could not effectively oversee the area of OTC trading, the SEC 
had granted the NASD extensive oversight and power, establishing it as 
a quasi-governmental body and giving it disciplinary authority over 
these firms.126  Firms were enticed to join mainly due to the economic 
incentives that came with being subject to such regulations.  “Broker-
dealers who were members of [the] NASD were charged a ‘wholesale’ 
price when they purchased or sold securities from other NASD 
members; non-NASD members had to pay the same price as the 
public.”127
The agency’s tremendous growth called for new regulatory 
practices.128  In 1956, the NASD established qualification exams for 
those wishing to engage in securities business,129 a requirement aimed at 
protecting investors and ensuring that its member representatives were 
 123. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 17371, 45 
FR 83707 (LEXIS) n.44 (Dec. 19, 1980). 
 124. Annette L. Nazaretch, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks at the ALI-ABA Course of 
Study, Broker Dealer Regulation (Jan. 11, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
speech/2007/spch011107aln.htm. 
 125. It is important to note that a predecessor existed prior to establishment of the 
NASD, formed by the Code Committee under the National Recovery Act of 1933. See 
History of the NASD, http://www.people.hbs.edu/aperold/resource/ISR/Teaching%20N 
ote/AKS%20-%20History%20of%20the%20NASD.doc (last visited May 1, 2008).  The 
NRA was declared unconstitutional and 
the question of whether the Investment Bankers Code Committee should be continued 
on a voluntary basis was submitted to a vote of Code members.  Ninety percent of 
those who voted agreed to join and finance such an organization.  The Code 
Committee thus became the Investment bankers  Conference Committee, its function 
to be one of discussion and conference with federal agencies looking toward the 
establishment of an organization to preserve and formalize the values of the code.  
Within a year, a successor organization known as the Investment Bankers Conference, 
Inc., was established to proceed more formally towards the objective of a legal entity 
empowered to administer rules promoting ‘high standards of commercial honor.’ 
Id. 
 126. Id. at 189. 
 127. See SELIGMAN, supra note 68, at 188. 
 128. History of the NASD, supra note 125. 
 129. Id. 
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knowledgeable and fit to advise the public.  Because the NASD saw a 
surge in customers ill-served “by brokers who were often inept,”130 the 
NASD made its exams more difficult.131  After four years of 
consultation with the SEC, the NASD ordered the construction of “a 
national electronic data-processing and communications system to 
provide instantaneous over-the-counter price quotations from over-the-
counter market-makers.”132  The National Association of Securities 
Dealers Automated Quotations (“NASDAQ”) system went into effect in 
1971.133  Automation revolutionized the OTC market.134  While serving 
only as a quotation system at its inception, by the end of its first year in 
existence, it had expanded to also gather and distribute volume data.135
The NASD’s regulatory duties continued to rise from 1975 to 2001, 
prompting the organization to return to its original roots as exclusively a 
self-regulatory organization.  To help accomplish this goal, in 2000 the 
NASD decided to spin off NASDAQ.136  From its inception in 1937, the 
NASD grew to become one of the most influential and authoritative 
regulatory bodies in the U.S.137  The NASD’s decision to merge with the 
NYSE in 2007 further cemented its prominence in the securities 
industry. 
III.  PROBLEMS WITH DUAL REGULATION 
While the concept of multiple regulators might in theory seem 
ideal, in practice it created many unnecessary complexities.  Complying 
with two SROs’ rules led to some trying issues for the securities 
industry.138  The greatest challenges resulted from the conflicting rules 
and high costs of compliance.139  Responsible for independently 
promulgating rules for their member firms, these agencies were under no 
obligation to consult with each other when developing their rules, 
 130. SOBEL, supra note 99, at 248. 
 131. Id. 
 132. SELIGMAN, supra note 68, at 353. 
 133. Id. at 490. 
 134. See id. 
 135. History of NASD, supra note 125. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See Stephen L. Carlson & Frank A. Fernandez, The Costs of Compliance in the 
U.S. Securities Industry, 7 SIA RESEARCH REPORTS 1 (2006), available at 
http://archives2.sifma.org/research/pdf/RsrchRprtVol7-2.pdf. 
 139. Id. 
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resulting in frequent overlap.140  These difficulties were identified as the 
principal reasons for the consolidation.141  While only firms dually 
regulated were affected, they comprised some of the largest firms in the 
securities business.142  Of the nearly 5,100 brokerage firms in the U.S., 
approximately 200 were subject to dual regulation143 and consisted of 
the largest securities firms in the country.144  Therefore, the detrimental 
effects were substantial enough to warrant change. 
Perhaps the greatest impetus for the merger was the need to end 
duplication.  As successfully demonstrated by the FSA, a centralized 
regulatory source is the optimal structure to address such issues.145  As 
provided by FINRA’s CEO, Mary Schapiro,146 having two, separate 
SROs resulted in “a duplicative, sometimes conflicting system that 
[made] inefficient use of resources, and as such, [could be] detrimental 
to the ultimate goal of investor protection.”147  Independently, the NYSE 
and the NASD oversaw more than 5,000 “securities firms doing 
business with the public in the United States.”148  Marc E. Lackritz, 
President of SIFMA, testified before Congress in 2006 and voiced the 
association’s concerns regarding multiple SROs, mainly citing 
 140. Id. 
 141. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Amend the By-Laws of NASD to 
Implement Governance and Related Changes to Accommodate the Consolidation of the 
Member Firm Regulatory Functions of NASD and NYSE Regulation, Inc., Exchange 
Act Release No. 34-55495, File No. SR-NASD-2007-023 (Mar. 20, 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasd/2007/34-55495.pdf [hereinafter Notice of Filing 
Proposed Rule Change]. 
 142. Carrie Johnson, SEC Approves One Watchdog For Brokers Big and Small, 
WASH. POST, July 27, 2007, at D2. 
 143. Glauber Testimony, supra note 66. 
 144. See Fortune 500 List of Largest Securities Firms, http://money.cnn.com/magazi 
nes/fortune/fortune500/2007/performers/companies/profits/index.html (last visited Apr. 
30, 2008). 
 145. See generally FINANCIAL SERVICE AUTHORITY, PRINCIPLES-BASED 
REGULATION: FOCUSING ON THE OUTCOMES THAT MATTER (2007), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/principles.pdf (discussing principles based regulation 
in the U.K.). 
 146. Notice of Filing Proposed Rule Change, supra note 141. 
 147. Id. 
 148. NYSE Group, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 8-K), ex. 99.2 (Nov. 24, 2006), 
available at http://www.secinfo.com/drDX9.v1b2.b.htm#1stPage. 
2008 “FIN RAH!” . . . A WELCOME CHANGE 847 
 
duplication and disorganization.149  This sentiment was consistently 
echoed by members of the industry. 
Those organizations subject to dual regulation “expend[ed] 
significant time, resources and effort interpreting and applying different 
standards to their businesses, including different recordkeeping, 
procedural and audit trail requirements for the same product or 
service.”150  Broker-dealers belonging to both agencies were subject to 
not only two separate, but also sometimes inconsistent, sets of rules.  
Even where the agencies had identical rules on a particular issue, each 
SRO in some instances interpreted the rules differently.151  Many 
securities firms often raised their dissatisfaction over such incongruity 
within the regulatory system.152  Moreover, these inconsistencies opened 
the door for regulatory arbitrage, leading not only to inefficiency and 
high costs for firms, but also creating the risk of firms taking advantage 
of the system and providing a disservice to the investing public.153  Such 
issues led to the proposal and subsequent approval of the merger. 
In addition to efficiency and consistency, the consolidation also 
reduced the excessive costs associated with complying with two sets of 
rules.  Much criticism of the previous structure “center[ed] around the 
cost of compliance . . . . According to one report by SIFMA, securities 
firms spent $23.2 billion on compliance in 2004 and an estimated $25.5 
billion in 2005.”154  Some of these costs could be attributed to firms 
having to build intricate surveillance systems, training staff and 
developing efficient processes to ensure fulfillment of their regulatory 
 149. A Review of Self Regulatory Organizations in the Securities Market: Hearing 
Before S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (Mar. 9, 2006) (statement of 
Marc E. Lackritz, President, Securities Industry Association), available at 
http://www.sifma.org/legislative/testimony/archives/Lackritz3-9-06.html. 
 150. Supporting and Improving SRO Consolidation, SEC. INDUS. NEWS, June 11, 
2007, available at 2007 WLNR 10863703 (Westlaw). 
 151. See Reinventing Self-Regulation, Sec. Indus. Assoc., White Paper, Jan. 5, 
2000, updated Oct. 14, 2003, available at http://www.sifma.org/legislative/testimony/pd 
f_archives/reinventingselfreg.html. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Mary L. Schapiro, Remarks at the Distinguished Speaker Series at Georgetown 
University McDonough School of Business (Sept. 26, 2007), http://www.finra.org/Press 
Room/SpeechesTestimony/MaryL.Schapiro/P037079 (last visited May 1, 2008). 
 154. Simon Butler, NASD Chief Mary L. Schapiro is Gearing Up for the Challenges 
Posed by the Consolidation with NYSE Regulation, ON WALL ST., June 1, 2007, 
available at 2007 WLNR 10205905 (Westlaw). 
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obligations.155  FINRA expects the consolidation to result in lower costs 
and fees to these firms.156  Financial relief is expected since there will be 
one less SRO regulating the industry.  This is certainly a welcome 
benefit as financial firms continue to suffer economically from the 
subprime crisis.157
IV.  THE CONSOLIDATION 
While truly a significant occasion in the history of the securities 
industry, the consolidation emerged out of several recent events.  In a 
1999 speech concerning market structure at Columbia University, then 
SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt spoke about the frustrations of dual 
regulation.158  He “raised concerns as to whether for-profit, shareholder-
owned exchanges qualitatively increased the conflicts of interest 
inherent in this structure so as to warrant a separation of member 
regulation from market regulation, with member regulation ideally put in 
a single SRO for all members.”159  This was subsequently referred to as 
the “‘hybrid’ model of self-regulation.”160  After this speech came a 
SIFMA White Paper, which analyzed several alternate SRO models and 
ultimately embraced the hybrid model.161  These events laid the 
groundwork for the consolidation. 
In conformity with the requirements of the Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1934, the NASD filed its proposed rule change with the SEC on 
March 19, 2007.162  The submitted notice outlined several key changes 
to the NASD’s by-laws that would accommodate the merger, including 
changes to its new governance structure.163  On March 26, 2007, the 
 155. See Carlson & Fernandez, supra note 138, at 6. 
 156. Notice of Filing Proposed Rule Change, supra note 141. 
 157. Lingling Wei & Randall Smith, Wall Street Gears for Its New Pain, WALL ST. 
J., Mar. 3, 2008, at C1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1204505698954065 
11.html. 
 158. Levine, supra note 121.
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Levine, supra note 121.  SIFMA White Papers explore a variety of securities 
industry topics.  Recent issues can be found on SIFMA’s website at 
http://www.sifma.org/regulatory/white-papers.shtml. 
 162. See Notice of Filing Proposed Rule Change, supra note 141; NASD Release 
2007-023, http://www.finra.org/RulesRegulation/RuleFilings/2007RuleFilings/P018845 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2008). 
 163. See Notice of Filing Proposed Rule Change, supra note 141. 
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proposed rule change was published and commentary solicited from the 
public.164  Over 70 comment letters from industry firms, consumer 
advocates and investors voicing their opinions towards the merger and 
assisting the SEC in its approval decision were received.165
A.  Comment Letters 
1.  Opposition 
Smaller firms mainly voiced opposition to the consolidation 
because they believed their interests were not being considered.166  The 
three main areas of concern were: the by-law changes, the one-time 
payment to firms, and the arbitration forum. 
The first area of concern was the by-law change.  Most of the 
comments received opposing adoption of the by-law changes suggested 
that the new by-laws would not protect investors and would not give 
small brokerage firms adequate representation.167  Many of the smaller 
firms already felt that the industry favored the larger companies and that 
they were at a disadvantage, especially regarding the cost of compliance 
with regulatory provisions.168  In response to this concern, the NASD 
provided that this new organization would better protect investors 
because it would streamline securities firm regulation and take action 
ensuring that individuals advising the public were well-trained and that 
the products recommended were suitable for their clients.169
FINRA also believes that the new governance structure affords 
small brokerage firms greater input and representation.170  One benefit is 
that they will now have three seats on the FINRA board, instead of the 
 
 164. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Amend the By-Laws of NASD to 
Implement Governance and Related Changes to Accommodate the Consolidation of the 
Member Firm Regulatory Functions of NASD and NYSE Regulation, Inc., 76 Fed. Reg. 
14149 (Mar. 26, 2007), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/rules_regs/docum 
ents/rule_filing/p018866.pdf. 
 165. See e.g., Comments on NASD Rulemaking, http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-
2007-023/nasd2007023.shtml (last visited May 1, 2008). 
 166. See e.g., id. (noting the concerns, questions and comments different affected 
groups had about the consolidation). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Letter from Bonnie K. Wachtel to SEC (Apr. 16, 2007), http://sec.gov/commen 
ts/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-56.pdf. 
 169. Schapiro, Remarks at SIFMA, supra note 32. 
 170. Butler, supra note 154. 
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one seat they had on the NASD board.171  Small firms will also be the 
only ones allowed to select their representatives.172  Additionally, “the 
small firm advisory board will be 50% elected instead of solely 
appointed by the NASD.”173  This board will determine which 
exemptions might be appropriate for these companies174 and will serve 
as the voice of the smaller firms, ensuring “that issues of particular 
interest and concern to small firms are effectively communicated to and 
considered by the FINRA Board of Governors.”175
The second area of concern was the $35,000 payment.  In 
anticipation of the cost savings to firms as a result of the consolidation, 
FINRA gave each member firm a one-time $35,000 payment.176  Several 
commentators felt that the amount was inadequate and that more could 
have been offered.177  In response, the NASD explained that as a tax-
exempt 501(c)(6) corporation, it is not permitted to pay out any form of 
dividends because doing so would result in forfeiture of this status.178  
The NASD consulted with the Internal Revenue Service prior to 
announcing the expected disbursement amount,179 who granted approval 
because the payment represented the projected cash flows for each firm 
as a result of the consolidation.180  More specifically, it did not 
constitute a tax code violation because the payment is solely based upon 
the cost efficiencies that the consolidation is expected to yield.181
The third area of concern was the selection of arbitration for the 
merged entity’s dispute resolution forum.  The critics that cited the 
 171. Id.  Having more seats on the board allows small firms greater input in 
regulatory changes or proposals that may affect them. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id.  Previously, the advisory board from small firms was solely appointed by 
the NASD. Id. 
 174. Donna Block, Regulatory Consolidation Raises Concerns, N.Y.L.J., May 24, 
2007, at 5.
 175. FINRA, FINRA Small Firm Advisory Board, http://www.finra.org/Resources/ 
InformationforSmallFirms/p010702 (last visited Jan. 24, 2008). 
 176. NYSE Group Inc., supra note 149. 
 177. Comments on NASD Rulemaking, supra note 167. 
 178. See Response Letter from T. Grant Callery, NASD, to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, 
SEC (July 16, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-85.pdf. 
 179. See Notice of Filing Proposed Rule Change, supra note 141, n.6. 
 180. See Response Letter from Mario J. Verdolini, Jr., Davis Polk & Wardwell, to 
Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC (July 16, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-
023/nasd2007023-87.pdf. 
 181. Id. 
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arbitration forum182 as a point of conflict took issue with the 
composition of the arbitration panels, the costs to customers and 
dispositive motions.183  Integration of the two forums is still in progress 
and the comments concerning the panels and dispositive motions will be 
taken into consideration.184  One critic claimed that a share of the cost 
savings from the consolidation should have been used to reduce 
customer fees for use of the new arbitration forum.185  In its response, 
the NASD provided that the resulting lower costs for administration of 
the forum impacted the firms, not the investors.186  Firms are the ones 
that bear the expenses associated with the forum because they are the 
ones that have to pay for “staff salaries and benefits, arbitrator training 
and travel, long-term leased space, computer systems, supplies, and 
equipment.”187  Users of the forum, on the other hand, are only 
responsible for paying fees associated with administration of their own 
personal claims.188  Therefore, it is justified that the cost savings be 
spread to the firms and not to individual investors. 
2.  Support 
Many voiced the end of duplication, inefficiency and exorbitant 
costs as the basis for their support for the merger,189 regarding the 
 
 182. See Letter from Public Members of Securities Industry Conference on 
Arbitration to Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC (Jan. 12, 2007), 
http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-10.pdf; Letter from Les 
Greenberg to SEC (Apr. 11, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-
023/nasd2007023-19.pdf; Letter from Kathryn L. Lundgren to SEC (Apr. 16, 2007), 
http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-67.pdf; Letter from Steven B. 
Caruso, President, Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association to SEC (Apr. 16, 2007), 
http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-65.pdf; Letter from William F. 
Galvin, Sec’y of the Commonwealth, Mass. Sec. Div., Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts to SEC (Apr. 18, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-
023/nasd2007023-73.pdf. 
 183. Response Letter from Linda D. Fienberg, President, Dispute Resolution, 
NASD, to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC (May 29, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-
2007-023/nasd2007023-81.pdf. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. The following comment letters all support consolidation. See Letter from Joan 
Hinchman, Nat’l Ass’n of Compliance Prof’ls, Inc. to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Apr. 
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change as a positive move for the industry.  One supporter felt that the 
merger would allow “business owners and representatives [to] spend 
more time focusing on their customers rather than [on] a myriad of 
inconsistent rules from multiple regulators that are not based on the type 
of business or service that [they] provide.”190  Supporters of the merger 
also called for expedited approval.191  Such sentiments support FINRA’s 
belief that its new configuration will provide greater protection for 
26, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-77.pdf; Letter from 
Michael J. Mungenast, CEO, ProEquities to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Apr. 23, 2007), 
http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-56.pdf; Letter from Joseph P. 
Borg, President, N. Am. Sec. Admin. Ass’n, Inc. to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Apr. 
17, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-74.pdf; Letter from 
William R. Pictor, President, Trubee, Collins & Co., Inc., to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC 
(Apr. 16, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-72.pdf; Letter 
from M. LaRae Bakerink, CEO, WBB Securities, Inc. to Christopher Cox, Chairman, 
SEC (Apr. 16, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-71.pdf; 
Letter from Walter S. Robertson, III, President & CEO, Scott & Stringfellow Inc. to 
Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Apr. 16, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-
023/nasd2007023-70.pdf; Letter from Dale E. Brown, CEO, Fin. Serv. Inst. To Nancy 
Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Apr. 16, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-
023/nasd2007023-56.pdf; Letter from Mark S. Casady, Chairman and CEO, LPL Fin. 
Serv. to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Apr. 16, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-
2007-023/nasd2007023-63.pdf; William A. Johnstone, President and CEO, D.A. 
Davidson & Co. to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Apr. 16, 2007), 
http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-62.pdf; Letter from William 
C. Alsover, Chairman, Centennial Sec. Co.  to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Apr. 16, 
2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-61.pdf; Letter from 
Lisa Roth, President Nat’l Ass’n of Indep. Broker-Dealers to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC 
(Apr. 16, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-58.pdf; Letter 
from Deborah Castiglioni, CEO, Cutter & Co. Inc. to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Apr. 
16, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-567pdf; Letter from 
David W. Stringer, President, Prospera Fin. Serv. Inc. to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC 
(Apr. 16, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-55.pdf; Letter 
from Ira D. Hammerman, Managing Dir., SIFMA to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Apr. 
16, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-54.pdf; Letter from 
Albert Kramer, President, Kramer Sec. Corp. to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Apr. 16, 
2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-51.pdf; Letter from E. 
John Moloney, President and CEO, Moloney Sec. Co., Inc. to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, 
SEC (Apr. 15, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-45.pdf; 
Letter from Sennett Kirk, Kirk Sec. Corp. to SEC (Apr. 12, 2007), 
http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-27.pdf. 
 190. Letter from M. LaRae Bakerink, supra note 189. 
 191. Id. 
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investors.  FINRA commenced its operations under the approval of the 
SEC in July 2007.192
B.  Governance Structure 
One of the most talked about changes is FINRA’s new governance 
structure.193  Mary Schapiro, formerly CEO and Chairwoman of the 
NASD, serves as FINRA’s CEO and Richard Ketchum, formerly head 
of NYSE Regulation, Inc., serves as Chairman of FINRA’s interim 
board.194  The interim board of governors consists of twenty-three 
members for a transitional period of three years and is structured as 
follows: 
• The CEO and Non-Executive Chairman will serve on the interim 
Board of Governors. 
• Eleven Governors will be appointed from outside the securities 
industry. 
▪ The current NASD Board and NYSE Boards each will 
appoint five Public Governors. 
▪ One Public Governor will be appointed jointly by both 
organizations. 
• Ten Governors will be from inside the securities industry. 
▪ Three representatives (nominated by NASD) to be elected 
by small firms (1-150 registered representatives); small 
firms may also present their own slate of nominees. 
▪ One representative (jointly nominated) to be elected by 
medium-sized firms (151-499 registered representatives); 
medium-sized firms may also present their own slate of 
nominees.  Three representatives (nominated by NYSE) 
 
 192. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Gives Regulatory Approval for NASD and 
NYSE Consolidation (July 26, 2007), available at http://sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-
151.htm.  FINRA was originally named the Securities Industry Regulatory Authority 
(“SIRA”). Smith & Scannell, supra note 5.  After receiving public objection concerning 
the proposed name because of its similarity to an Arabic word, “commonly spelled 
Sirah, which refers to the biographies of the Prophet Muhammad,” it was changed to 
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. Susanne Craig, Deals & Dealmakers: For 
the NASD, Goodbye, SIRA – Kay-Syrah Sira – Street’s Securities Cop Renames Itself 
After Flap; A Muslim Connection, WALL ST. J., July 13, 2007, at C2. 
 193. Comment on NASD Rulemaking, supra note 165. 
 194. FINRA, FINRA Board of Governors, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/Corp 
orateInformation/FINRALeadership/FINRABoardofGovernors/index.htm (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2008). 
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to be elected by large firms (500 or more registered 
representatives); large firms may also present their own 
slate of nominees. 
▪ Three repressentatives will fill the remaining three seats, 
including an NYSE-appointed floor member, an NASD-
appointed representative of independent dealers/insurance 
affiliated broker-dealers and a jointly appointed 
representative of investment companies.195
 
Merging of the two SROs resulted in a “streamlined [organization] . 
. . better suited to [deal with] the complexity and competitiveness of 
today’s global capital markets.”196  In recent years, many companies, 
even those eligible to list their securities in the U.S., have opted to list 
abroad, naming a fragmented regulatory infrastructure as a leading 
reason.197  It was, therefore, only a matter of time before a consolidation 
would be necessary to promote confidence in the U.S. economic system.  
FINRA is responsible for policing nearly every facet of the securities 
industry, from individual registration, examination and training to rule 
writing, rule enforcement and examination of firms.198  In addition to 
carrying out its own regulatory responsibilities, FINRA “also performs 
market regulation under contract for The NASDAQ Stock Market, the 
American Stock Exchange, the International Securities Exchange and 
the Chicago Climate Exchange.”199  Staffed with over 3,000 
employees,200 it is hoped that the organization is well-equipped to 
handle the industry challenges that will arise in the future and prevent 
future market disasters. 
 195. NYSE Group Inc., supra note 149. 
 196. About FINRA, supra note 6 (quoting Mary L. Schapiro, CEO, FINRA). 
 197. See Liz Moyer, Too Many Regulators for Wall Street?, FORBES.COM, Nov. 9, 
2006, available at http://www.forbes.com/2006/11/09/sia-wall-street-boca-biz-cx_lm_1 
109sia.html. 
 198. See About FINRA, supra note 6. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
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V.  BENEFITS AND EFFECTS 
A.  The Investing Public 
Subprime-related arbitrations and lawsuits have already begun and 
the number will surely increase as more investors advance investment 
complaints.201  FINRA will provide the principal forum for securities 
arbitration and mediation claims involving member firms.202  Prior to 
consolidation, the NASD had “operat[ed] the largest securities dispute 
resolution forum, processing over 4,600 arbitrations and nearly 1,000 
mediations in 2006”203 alone.  It continually made efforts to streamline 
its arbitration and mediation processes and in 2007 revised its Code of 
Arbitration Procedure, making it a less onerous process for users.204
Among its new customer-friendly features, the revised code is 
organized in a logical sequence,205 provides a comprehensive definitions 
section, and uses “plain English” explanations throughout.206  FINRA is 
currently working on eliminating discrepancies and inconsistencies to 
develop uniform arbitration and mediation procedures that take into 
account the beneficial features of its predecessors.207
In addition to paying close attention to issues related to subprime 
mortgage-backed products,208 FINRA will also look into suitability 
issues and marketing of certain products to particular populations of 
 201. See Lori Pizzani, Morgan Keegan Lawsuits, Arb Claims Could be Tip of 
Subprime Iceberg, MONEY MGMT. EXECUTIVE, Jan. 14, 2008, available at 
http://www.mmexecutive.com/issues/2008_2/90216-1.html. 
 202. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Amend the By-Laws of NASD 
to Implement Governance and Related Changes to Accommodate the Consolidation of 
the Member Firm Regulatory Functions of NASD and NYSE Regulation, Inc, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-56145, File No. SR-NASD-2007-023, at 2-3 (July 26, 
2007), available at http://sec.gov/rules/sro/nasd/2007/34-56145.pdf. 
 203. Schapiro Testimony, supra note 2. 
 204. See NASD, Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes (Apr. 16, 
2007), http://www.finra.org/web/groups/rules_regs/documents/rule_filing/p018365.pdf. 
 205. Proposed Rule Change by NASD, File No. SR-NASD-2003-158, at 6 (Oct. 15, 
2003), http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/rules_regs/documents/rule_filing/nasdw_0093 
10.pdf. 
 206. Id. at 32.  “In 1998, the SEC launched an initiative to encourage issuers and 
self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”) to use “plain English” in disclosure documents 
and other materials used by investors.” Id. 
 207. See Levine, supra note 121. 
 208. See id. 
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investors such as seniors.209  Earlier this year, FINRA initiated two 
regulatory sweeps aimed at ensuring that firms are utilizing suitable 
sales practice methods in dealing with seniors and with those nearing 
retirement.210  Of concern are professional designations being used by 
registered representatives, implying expertise in areas such as retirement 
planning, when the registered representative did not undergo adequate 
training or does not possess specific knowledge in these areas.211  
FINRA is committed to tackling such issues and currently has 
approximately seventy open investigations relating to seniors.212  
Marketing tactics are also under close scrutiny, especially the use of 
“free lunch” investment seminars.213  In more than half of the free 
investment seminar investigations conducted by several regulators, 
including the SEC and FINRA, they found that the “sales materials—
including the invitations and advertisements for the events—contained 
claims that appeared to be exaggerated, misleading or otherwise 
unwarranted [a]nd [that] 12 [%] of the seminars appeared to involve 
fraud, ranging from unfounded projections of returns to sales of 
fictitious products.”214
FINRA plans to do better by constantly surveying the market.215  
FINRA will analyze investors’ experiences with the latest products,216 
identify potential regulatory issues and act expeditiously to prevent 
investor harm or immediately rectify any harm that has already 
occurred.217  Recent issues surrounding the subprime mortgage crisis 
 209. See Press Release, FINRA, FINRA Announces Major Regulatory Sweeps at 
Seniors Summit (Sept. 10, 2007), http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2007 
NewsReleases/P036809. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Press Release, FINRA, supra note 209. 
 213. See generally FINRA Investor Alert, “Free Lunch” Investment Seminars–
Avoiding the Heartburn of a Hard Sell, (Sept. 10, 2007), http://www.finra.org/Investor 
Information/InvestorAlerts/FraudsandScams/FreeLunchInvestmentSeminars-Avoiding 
theHeartburnofaHardSell/index.htm (discussing the negative aspects of free investment 
seminars). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Mary L. Schapiro, CEO, FINRA, Remarks at FINRA Fall Securities 
Conference (Oct. 11, 2007), http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/Mary 
L.Schapiro/P037180 [Schapiro, Remarks at FINRA Conference]. 
 216. Id.  To accomplish this, FINRA implemented the “Ahead of the Curve 
Program.” Id. 
 217. Id. 
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require regulators to take a proactive approach.  FINRA will continue to 
remain abreast of the regulatory controversies plaguing the industry and 
will look closely at how they will affect investors.218
B.  The Securities Industry 
The most grueling and complex challenge for FINRA will be 
synchronization of the NYSE’s and NASD’s rulebooks.219  “Member 
conduct rules in particular are being held up to significant scrutiny and 
detailed analysis and [FINRA is] fully committed to seeking broad input 
on the approaches [it] will recommend.”220  FINRA identified five 
principles to uphold while integrating the rulebooks.221  The first entails 
meticulous review of each former SRO’s rules to determine which, if 
any, is the better and more effective rule or whether a new rule should 
be created.222  Second, FINRA will also tailor each rule to the specific 
firm223 taking into account the diversity in member size, business model 
or type of customer.224  Third, FINRA will determine whether rules can 
be categorized in a “conceptual manner,” in hopes of giving firms more 
insight into the rationale behind the regulation.225  The fourth and fifth 
principles entail development of clearer rules and implementation of a 
“principles-based approach” wherever possible.226
Synchronization has commenced, and already has received 
criticism from the public.227  SIFMA recently raised some concerns 
regarding the coordination of these rules, warning that it could instead 
lead to triplication.228  At the heart of that assertion lays the current 
method of submitting rule changes.229  The process still seems disjointed 
according to SIFMA, which urges the SEC to suspend approval of the 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Schapiro, Remarks at SIFMA, supra note 32. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. See generally Harmonization Rule Could Lead to Triplication, WALL ST. 
LETTER, Sept. 3, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 19675359 (Westlaw) (discussing the 
need for a consolidated rulebook). 
 228. Id. 
 229. See id. 
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rule changes230 if FINRA “is unlikely to incorporate changes relating to 
the common rules into its rulebook.”231  Despite such commentary, 
FINRA has been actively submitting new rule changes232 in furtherance 
of its harmonization efforts. 
1.  Principles-Based Regulation 
Members of the U.S. financial industry have kept a vigilant eye on 
the principles-based approach to regulation employed abroad.  This 
method of regulation is touted as one of high effectiveness and 
efficiency and has been in use by the United Kingdom since 2001.233  
This form of oversight focuses on outcomes by setting standards as to 
the types of actions and behaviors expected from firms, rather than 
focusing on the particular rules.234  As explained by SIFMA, 
[R]egulation by principles and by rules is best described as a 
continuum of regulatory options.  At one end of the continuum a 
regulator articulates principles and leaves a firm to determine wholly 
how to achieve the outcome called for in the principle; at the other 
end of the continuum the regulator dictates through a prescriptive 
rule how the outcome must be achieved.  Within the continuum are 
various types of guidance that a regulator could promulgate to assist 
a firm in achieving outcomes.235
Some critics of principles-based oversight argue that such 
regulation only works in wholesale markets and that retail markets 
require rules-based oversight.236  FINRA has provided that it will use a 
combination of the two to ensure that the most efficient method of 
regulation is employed.237  The diversification within the securities 
 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. See, e.g., Proposed Rule Change by FINRA, File No. SR-2007-008 (Aug. 30, 
2007), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/rules_regs/documents/rule_filing/ 
p036662.pdf. 
 233. See generally The Seventh Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture On Corporate, 
Securities and Financial Law: “The U.K. FSA: Nobody Does It Better?”, 12 FORDHAM 
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 259 (2007). 
 234. See id. at 270. 
 235. Lackritz, Testimony, supra note 31. 
 236. See The Rules of the Game, ECONOMIST, Sept. 15, 2007, available at 2007 
WLNR 18026488 (Westlaw).
 237. Schapiro, Remarks at SIFMA, supra note 32. 
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realm requires FINRA to utilize the most advantageous processes, 
including those that are principles-based, wherever possible.238
2.  Single Exam Program 
Developing a single examination program poses another 
multifaceted challenge for FINRA.239  Broker-dealers belonging to 
multiple SROs are subject to periodic audits by these organizations to 
identify any regulatory deficiencies.240  As a single entity, FINRA will 
provide its members with one examination program.241  It will require 
bringing together two diverse examination teams, training them on the 
new technological platforms, and hopefully creating a synergetic and 
symbiotic relationship between them.242  The organization hopes to fully 
integrate its examination program by 2008, but recognizes the obstacles 
that such an endeavor may present.243  Among them, the highest hurdle 
may be identifying, extracting and retaining the strengths of each 
program while establishing one unified approach. 
FINRA will employ a more risk-based methodology in its 
investigations,244 advancing its commitment of considering each firm’s 
unique needs while developing its examination program.  This will 
require looking at both the financial company’s areas of deficiency as 
well as the issues plaguing the existent regulatory landscape.  FINRA’s 
surveillance of certain firms will also be heightened.245  FINRA will 
work with each firm to address regulatory concerns regarding their 
product offerings and any related market issues.246
 
 238. Id. 
 239. See Schapiro Testimony, supra note 2. 
 240. See Maloney Act, supra note 120. 
 241. Schapiro, Remarks at FINRA Conference, supra note 219. 
 242. See Schapiro Testimony, supra note 2. 
 243. See Schapiro, Remarks at FINRA Conference, supra note 215. 
 244. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman and CEO, NASD, Remarks at the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce First Annual Capital Markets Summit: Securing America’s 
Competitiveness (Mar. 14, 2007), http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony 
/MaryL.Schapiro/P018816. 
 245. See id. 
 246. See id. 
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3.  “Firm Gateway” System 
FINRA is also introducing several new tools and programs for the 
industry.  One of FINRA’s newest technological innovations is the Firm 
Gateway System, providing member firms easy access to regulatory 
forms, filings, notices of upcoming rule changes, and other useful 
resources.247  This portal will allow firms to submit their FINRA 
electronic forms online, expediting the submission process.248  The 
system will also reduce the need for multiple passwords to log into 
different programs by providing easy access to other applications.249  
After complete implementation, the system “will be available to about 
25,000 firm users—mostly compliance personnel at FINRA-regulated 
broker-dealers.”250
4.  Small Firm Emergency Partner Program 
FINRA is also taking steps to assist small firms with business 
continuity planning.251  Recent tragic events such as hurricane Katrina as 
well as business interruptions like mass black-outs have been 
detrimental to businesses, requiring that organizations be equipped to 
continue operations in case of such disasters.252  Large companies have 
the resources for such back-up capabilities, but many small firms do not.  
To deal with such issues, FINRA has developed the “Small Firm 
Emergency Partner Program.”253  This voluntary program will match a 
firm with another “pre-established partner firm unaffected by the event 
to step in temporarily and assist [the firm’s] customers regarding 
liquidating transactions.”254  At the contracting firm’s discretion, “they 
can expand their agreement to include limited categories of purchases, 
such as money market funds.”255  This new program further 
 
 247. See FINRA Firm Gateway System, http://www.finra.org/web/groups/reg_syste 
ms/documents/regulatory_systems/p036867.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2008). 
 248. Schapiro, Remarks at FINRA Conference, supra note 215. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. See, e.g., FINRA, Small Firm Emergency Partner Program: Overview and 
Guide, http://www.finra.org/web/groups/rules_regs/documents/rules_regs/p037162.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2008). 
 252. Id. 
 253. See Schapiro, Remarks at FINRA Conference, supra note 215. 
 254. FINRA, Small Firm Emergency Partner Program, supra note 251. 
 255. Id. 
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demonstrates FINRA’s commitment to the industry’s smaller 
companies. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Financial companies, especially those having experienced some 
type of merger or acquisition, are fully aware of the complexities and 
intricacies involved in such transactions.256  The process can be very 
gradual and, as some organizations can attest, never truly 
accomplished.257  The FINRA merger “required bringing together two 
workforces, two complete sets of technologies, two cultures and two 
funding mechanisms.”258  FINRA has been forthcoming in informing the 
public that the process is complex and that it is working to have full 
harmonization as quickly as possible.259
Synchronization of the rules is perhaps the greatest challenge faced 
by this new organization and it is safe to say that failure of this initiative 
will render the merger a disappointment in the eyes of many.  Therefore, 
it is imperative that FINRA is given support to allow them to get it right.  
As the first considerable change in the regulatory system in decades, it is 
expected that many will voice their opposition and criticism.  Many are 
resistant to change, and some comments will simply be tenuous.  Others, 
however, will be warranted, especially worries concerning the 
expediency of rule harmonization and choosing those most suitable to 
ensure efficient regulation.  Certainly, it would not be in the best interest 
of the industry or the public to employ lax or subpar regulations. 
Adequate oversight of the financial industry is necessary to build 
investor confidence.  As we continue to feel the effects of the subprime 
mortgage crisis and worries of a recession pervade the industry,260 it is 
crucial that the public maintain some level of confidence in the financial 
markets.  FINRA is dedicated to investor protection, and the merger 
 256. See generally R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAW 
OF CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 9.9 MERGER AGREEMENT (Aspen 
Law & Business 2002) (1998) (stating the Delaware law regarding merger agreements). 
 257. See Why Do So Many Mergers Fail?, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, Mar. 30, 2005, 
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/articlepdf/1137.pdf?CFID=50312265&CFTOKEN
=26349611&jsessionid=a83051919f32372c2458. 
 258. Schapiro, Remarks at FINRA Conference, supra note 215. 
 259. Schapiro, Remarks at SIFMA, supra note 32. 
 260. See Recession Fears Hit Stocks, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2008, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120518660320825319.html. 
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came at just the right time.  The move to consolidate fostered an 
obligation to the public and to the industry, helping to restore and 
promote a robust U.S. market economy and to preserve market integrity 
at a time when both U.S. market wealth and integrity have been shaken.
